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pk:federal:UY2FqaJw1-apaUY2Fqa-cp%2BUY2Fp — Countervailing Duties Ordinance, 2001(Repealed by Act XIII of 2015)
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Analyze this law with AITHE COUNTERVAILING DUTIES ORDINANCE, 2001
CONTENTS
PREAMBLE.
.
Short title, extent and commencement
Definitions
Levy of countervailing duty
Circumstances in which subsidy shall be deemed to exist
Countervailable subsidies
Noncountervailable subsidies
Calculation of amount of countervailable subsidy
General provisions on calculation of countervailable subsidies
Determination of injury
Further circumstances in which injury may be found to exist
Initiation of investigation
Principles governing investigation
Provisional countervailing duties
Undertakings
Termination of investigation without measures
Imposition of definitive countervailing duties
Retroactivity
Duration of definitive countervailing duty
Expiry reviews
Interim reviews
Accelerated reviews
Refunds
General provisions on reviews and refund
Circumvention
General provisions
Verification visits
Sampling
Noncooperation
Confidentiality
Disclosure
Relationships between countervailing duty measures and multilateral remedies
Appeal to the appellate tribunal
Power of the appellate tribunal to call for and examine record
Power to make rules
Public servants
Failure to disclose correct information offence
Cognizance of offences
Protection to persons prejudiced in employment because of assisting the
commission
Public file to be maintained for interested party and access thereto
Official file to be maintained by the commission
Appointment of advisers and consultants
Indemnity
Removal of difficulties
Ordinance to override other laws
FIRST SCHEDULE.
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SECOND SCHEDULE.
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THIRD SCHEDULE.
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FOURTH SCHEDULE.
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FIFTH SCHEDULE.
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THE COUTERVAILING DUTIES ORDINANCE, 2001
ORDINANCE No. I OF 2001
[3rd January, 2001]
An Ordinance to amend and consolidate the law relating to imposition of countervailing duties to
offset subsidies.
WHEREAS it is expedient and to give effect in Pakistan to the provisions of Articles VI and XVI
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1994, and to the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures and to amend and consolidate the law relating to imposition of
countervailing duties to offset such subsidies, to provide a framework for investigation and
determination of such subsidies and injury in respect of goods imported into Pakistan and matters
ancillary thereto or connected therewith;
AND WHEREAS the imposition of countervailing duties to offset injurious subsidization is in the
public interest;
AND WHEREAS the National Assembly and the Senate stand suspended in pursuance of the
Proclamation of the fourteenth day of October, 1999, and the Provisional Constitution Order No. 1 of
1999;
AND WHEREAS the President is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary to
take immediate action;
NOW THEREFORE, in pursuance of the Proclamation of Emergency of the fourteenth day of
October, 1999, and the Provisional Constitution Order No. 1 of 1999, read with the Provisional
Constitutional (Amendment) Order No. 9 of 1999, and in exercise of all powers enabling him in that
behalf, the President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is pleased to make and promulgate the
following Ordinance:__
PART I
PRELIMINARY
1. Short title, extent and commencement.– (1) This Ordinance may be called the Countervailing
Duties Ordinance, 2001.
(2) It extends to the whole of Pakistan.
(3) It shall come into force at once.
2. Definitions.– In this Ordinance, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,–
(a) “Agreement on Subsidies” means the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures included in Annex (1A) to the Final Act of the Results of the Uruguay Round
concerning the Implementation of Article XVI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, 1994;
(b) “Appellate Tribunal” means the Appellate Tribunal established under the AntiDumping
Ordinance, 2000 ( LXV of 2000);
(c) “application” means an application submitted to the Commission pursuant to subsection
(1) of section 11;
(d) “association” means a trade organisation as defined in the Trade Organisations Ordinance,
1961( XLV of 1961), which has been granted or deemed to have been granted a licence
thereunder;
(e) “Commission” means the National Tariff Commission established under the National
Tariff Commission Act, 1990 (VI of 1990);
(f) “country” means any country or territory whether a member of the World Trade
Organisation or not and includes a customs union or customs territory;
(g) “countervailing measures” means any measures that may be taken by the Commission
under this Ordinance including imposition of countervailing duties, whether provisional or
definitive, or the acceptance of an undertaking;
(h) “definitive countervailing duty” means a duty imposed by the Commission under section
16, subsection (15) of section 14 or subsection (2) of section 17;
(i) “domestic industry” means the domestic producers as a whole of a like product or those of
them whose collective output of that product constitutes a major proportion of the total
domestic production of that product, except that when any such domestic producers are
related to the exporters or importers, or are themselves importers of the allegedly
subsidised product, in such a case “domestic industry” shall mean the rest of the domestic
producers.
Explanation.–For the purposes of this clause, producers shall be deemed to be related to
exporters or importers only if –
(i) one of them directly or indirectly controls the other;
(ii) both of them are directly or indirectly controlled by the same third person; or
(iii) together they directly or indirectly control a third person:
Provided that there are grounds for believing or suspecting that the effect of the relationship is
such as to cause the producer concerned to behave differently from nonrelated producers and for
that purpose one shall be deemed to control another when the former is legally or operationally in a
position to exercise restraint or direction over the latter:
Provided further that, in exceptional circumstances, as may be determined by the Commission,
the domestic industry in relation to a product
in question may be divided into two or more competitive markets and producers within each such
market may be regarded as a separate industry if–
(i) the producers within such a market sell all or almost all of their production of the product
in question in such a market; and
(ii) he demand in such a market is not to any substantial degree supplied by producers of the
product in question located elsewhere in Pakistan;
(j) “exporting country” means a country granting subsidy in respect of an investigated
product, which country may be either –
(i) the country of origin of the investigated product; or
(ii) where the investigated product is not exported directly to Pakistan but is transported
through an intermediate country, such intermediate country;
(k) “government” means the government or any public body within the territory of an
exporting country;
(l) “injury” means, unless otherwise specified, material injury to a domestic industry, threat of
material injury to a domestic industry or material retardation of the establishment of a
domestic industry, when subsidised imports are causing such injury;
(m) “interested party” includes –
(i) an exporter, foreign producer, an importer of an investigated product or an association
a majority of the members of which are producers, exporters or importers of such
product;
(ii) a producer of a like product in Pakistan or an association a majority of the members
of which produce a like product in Pakistan; and
(iii) such other person or group of persons as the Commission may, by notification in the
official Gazette, specify;
(n) “investigated product” means a product which is subject to an investigation under this
Ordinance;
(o) “investigation” means an investigation conducted under this Ordinance;
(p) “like product” means a product which is alike in all respects to an investigated product or,
in the absence of such a product, another product which, although not alike in all
respects, has characteristics closely resembling those of the investigated product;
(q) “prescribed” means prescribed by rules made under this Ordinance;
(r) “provisional countervailing duty” means a duty imposed by the Commission under section
13;
(s) “public notice” means a notice published by the Commission in at least one issue each of a
daily newspaper in the English language and a daily newspaper in the Urdu language
having wide circulation in Pakistan;
(t) “Schedule” mean the Schedule to this Ordinance;
(u) “subsidy” means a subsidy as defined in section 4 and “subsidization” shall be construed
accordingly; and
(v) “WTO” means the World Trade Organisation established pursuant to the Marrakesh
Agreement concluded in Marrakesh, Morocco, on the 15th April, 1994.
PART II
COUNTERVAILING MEASURES
3. Levy of countervailing duty.– (1) Where the Commission determines in accordance with the
provisions of this Ordinance that any exporting country pays or bestows, directly or indirectly, any
subsidy upon the manufacture or production therein or the exportation therefrom of any investigated
product including any subsidy on transportation of such product and such subsidy causes injury then,
upon the importation of any such product into Pakistan, the Commission shall, by notification in the
official Gazette, impose a countervailing duty thereon as provided for in this Ordinance.
(2) For the purposes of this Ordinance, a product shall be considered to be subsidised if it benefits
from a countervailable subsidy as provided for in section 4 and 5.
(3) A subsidy may be granted by a government of the country of origin of an investigated product
or by the government of an intermediate country from which the investigated product is exported to
Pakistan.
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Ordinance, where an investigated product is not
directly imported from the country of origin but exported to Pakistan from an intermediate country,
the provisions of this Ordinance shall be fully applicable and such transaction shall, where considered
appropriate by the Commission, by regarded as having taken place between the country of origin of
the investigated product and Pakistan.
PART III
DEFINITION OF SUBSIDY, COUNTERVAILABLE AND
NONCOUNTERVAILABLE SUBSIDIES
4. Circumstances in which subsidy shall be deemed to exist.– A subsidy shall be deemed to
exist if –
(a) there shall be financial contribution by a government, where –
(i) the government practice involves direct transfer of funds including grants, loans and
equity infusion, or potential direct transfer of funds or liabilities, or both;
(ii) government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected including
fiscal incentives such as tax credits:
Provided that exemption of an exported product from duties or taxes borne by a like
product when destined for domestic consumption, or remission of such duties or
taxes in amounts not in excess of those which have accrued, shall not be deemed to
be a subsidy provided that such exemption is granted in accordance with the
provisions of the First, Second and Third Schedules;
(iii) the government provides goods or services other than general infrastructure or
purchases goods; or
(iv) the government makes payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusts or directs a
private body to carry out one or more of the type of functions specified in subclauses (i), (ii) and (iii) which would normally be vested in the government and the
practice in, no real sense, differs from practices normally followed by governments;
(b) there is any form of income or price support within the meaning of Article XVI of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1994; and
(c) a benefit is thereby conferred.
5. Countervailable subsidies.– (1) A subsidy shall be subject to countervailing measures under
this Ordinance only if the Commission determines that such subsidy is specific in accordance with the
principles set out in subsections (2), (3), (4) and (5).
(2) In order to determine whether a subsidy is specific to an enterprise, industry or a group of
enterprises or industries, hereinafter referred to as “certain enterprises”, within the jurisdiction of a
granting authority, the Commission shall apply the following principles, namely:–
(a) where the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to which the granting authority
operates, explicitly limits access to a subsidy to certain enterprises, such subsidy shall be
specific;
(b) where the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to which the granting authority
operates, establishes objectives criteria or conditions governing the eligibility for, and the
amount of, a subsidy, specificity shall not exist, provided that the eligibility is automatic
and that such criteria and conditions are strictly adhered to;
Explanation.– For the purposes of clause (b), objective criteria or conditions mean criteria or
conditions which are neutral, which do not favour certain enterprises over other, and which are
economic in nature and horizontal in application, such as, number of employees or size of enterprise.
Such criteria or conditions must be clearly set out by law, regulation, or other official document, so as
to be capable of verification; and
(c) if, notwithstanding any appearance of nonspecificity resulting from the application of the
principles laid down in subclauses (a) and (b), there are reasons to believe that the
subsidy may in fact be specific, the following other factors may be considered by the
Commission, namely:–
(i) use of a subsidy programme by a limited number of certain enterprises;
(ii) predominant use by certain enterprises;
(iii) granting of disproportionately large amounts of subsidy to certain enterprises; and
(iv) manner in which discretion has been exercised by the granting authority in the
decision to grant a subsidy;
Explanation.– For the purposes of clause (c), information on the frequency with which
applications for a subsidy are refused or approved and the reasons for such decisions shall, in
particular, be considered.
(3) In applying the provisions of subclause (c) of subsection (2), the Commission shall take into
account the extent of diversification of economic activities within the jurisdiction of a granting
authority and the length of time during which subsidy programme has been in operation.
(4) A subsidy which is limited to certain enterprises located within a designated geographical
region within the jurisdiction of a granting authority shall be specific.
(5) The setting or changing of generally applicable tax rates by all levels of the government
entitled to do so shall not be deemed to be a specific subsidy.
(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (2), (3), (4) and (5), the following subsidies
shall be deemed to be specific, namely:–
(a) subsidies contingent, in law or in fact, whether solely or as one of several other conditions,
upon export performance, including those illustrated in the First Schedule:
Provided that subsidies shall be considered by the Commission to be contingent in fact upon
export performance when the facts demonstrate that granting of a subsidy, without having been made
legally contingent upon export performance, is in fact tied to actual or anticipated exportation or
export earnings:
Provided further that the mere fact that a subsidy is accorded to enterprises which export shall
not for that reason alone be considered by the Commission to be an export subsidy for the purposes
of this subclause; and
(b) subsidies contingent, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon the use of
domestic over imported goods.
(7) Any determination of specificity by the Commission under this section shall be substantiated
on the basis of positive evidence.
6. Noncountervailable subsidies.– (1) The following subsidies shall not be subjected to
countervailing measures under this Ordinance, namely:–
(a) subsidies which are not specific as determined in accordance with the provisions of
section 5;
(b) subsidies which are specific in accordance with the provisions of section 5 but which meet
the conditions set out in subsection (2), (4) or (6) as read with subsection (3), (5) and
(7); and
(c) the element of subsidy which may exist in any of the measures listed in the Fourth
Schedule:
Provided that the provisions of this subclause shall cease to apply on the first day of January,
2004.
(2) Subsidies for research activities conducted by firms or by higher education or research
establishments on a contract basis with firms shall not be subject to countervailing measures under
this Ordinance, if the subsidies cover not more than seventyfive per cent of the costs of industrial
research or fifty per cent of the costs of precompetitive development activity, provided that such
subsidies are limited exclusively to –
(a) personnel costs such as researchers, technicians and other supporting staff employed
exclusively in the research activity;
(b) costs of instruments, equipment, land and buildings used exclusively and permanently
except, when disposed of on a commercial basis, for the research activity;
(c) costs of consultancy and equivalent services used exclusively for the research activity
including boughtin research, technical knowledge, patents or otherwise;
(d) additional overhead costs incurred directly as a result of the research activity; and
(e) other running costs such as those of materials, supplies and the like incurred directly as a
result of the research activity.
(3) For the purpose of subsection (2) –
(a) allowable levels of noncountervailable subsidy shall be established by reference to the
total eligible costs incurred over the duration of an individual project and in the case of
programmes which span both industrial research and precompetitive development
activity, allowable level of noncountervailable subsidy shall not exceed a simple average
of the allowable levels of noncountervailable subsidy applicable to the above two
categories, calculated on the basis of all eligible costs as set forth in subclauses (a) to (e)
of subsection (2);
(b) the term “industrial research” means planned research or critical investigation aimed at
discovery of new knowledge, with the objective that such knowledge may be useful in
developing new products, processes, services, or in bringing about a significant
improvement to existing products, processes or services; and
(c) the term “precompetitive development activity” means translation of industrial research
findings into a plan, blueprint or design for new, modified or improved products,
processes or services, whether intended for sale or for use, including creation of a first
prototype which would not be capable of commercial use and, may further include
conceptual formulation and design of products, processes or services, alternatives and
initial demonstration or pilot projects, provided that the same projects cannot be
converted or used for industrial application or commercial exploitation but, shall exclude
routine or periodic alterations to existing products, production lines, manufacturing
processes, services, and other ongoing operations even though those alterations may
represent improvements.
(4) Subsidies to disadvantaged regions within the territory of an exporting country given pursuant
to a general framework of regional development, which would be nonspecific if the criteria set out in
section 5 were applied to each eligible region concerned, shall not be subject to countervailing
measures under this Ordinance, provided that–
(a) each disadvantaged region is a clearly designated contiguous geographical area with a
definable economic and administrative identity; and
(b) the region is regarded as disadvantaged on the basis of neutral and objective criteria,
indicating that the region’s difficulties arise out of more than temporary circumstances;
such criteria being clearly set out by law, regulation, or other official document, so as to
be capable of verification.
Explanation.– The criteria mentioned in subclause (b) shall include a measurement of economic
development which shall be based on at least one of the following factors, namely:–
(i) either income per capita, or household income per capita, or Gross Domestic Product per
capita, which must not be above eightyfive per cent of the average for the territory of an
exporting country; or
(ii) unemployment rate, which must be at least one hundred and ten per cent of the average
for the territory of an exporting country as measured over a
threeyears period. Such measurement, however, may be a composite one and may
include other factors.
(5) For the purposes of the subsection (4) –
(a) a “general framework of regional development” means that regional subsidy programmes
are part of an internally consistent and generally applicable regional development policy
and that regional development subsidies are not granted in isolated geographical points
having no, or virtually no, influence on the development or a region; and
(b) “neutral and objective criteria” means criteria which do not favour certain regions beyond
what is appropriate for elimination or reduction of regional disparities within the
framework of a regional development policy.
Explanation.– Regional subsidy programmes shall include ceilings on the amount of subsidy
which can be granted to each subsidized project. Such ceilings must be differentiated according to the
different levels of development of eligible regions and must be expressed in terms of investment costs
or the cost of job creation. Within such ceilings, the distribution of subsidy shall be sufficiently broad
and even to avoid predominant use of a subsidy by, or granting of disproportionately large amounts of
subsidy to, certain enterprises.
(6) Subsidies to promote adaptation of existing facilities to new environmental requirements
imposed by either law or regulation, or both which, result in greater constraints and financial burden
on firms shall not be subject to countervailing measures under this Ordinance, provided that subsidy–
(a) is a oneoff nonrecurring measure;
(b) is limited to twenty percent of the cost of adaptation;
(c) does not cover the cost of replacing and operating a subsidized investment which, must be
fully borne by the entity;
(d) is directly linked to and proportionate to an entity’s planned reduction of nuisances and
pollution, and does not cover any manufacturing cost savings which may be achieved;
and
(e) is available to all entities which can either adopt new equipment or production processes,
or both.
(7) For the purpose of subsection (6) the term “existing facilities” means facilities having been in
operation for at least two years at the time when new environmental requirements are imposed.
PART IV
CALCULATION OF THE AMOUNT OF
COUNTERVAILABLE SUBSIDY
7. Calculation of amount of countervailable subsidy.– (1) The amount of countervailable
subsidy, for the purposes of this Ordinance, shall be calculated by the Commission in terms of any
benefit conferred on a recipient which is found to exist during an investigation period for
subsidization which period, shall normally be the most recent accounting year of the beneficiary but
may be any other period of at least six months prior to initiation of an investigation for which reliable
financial and other relevant data are available.
(2) In determining the amount of countervailable subsidy the Commission shall apply the
following principles to calculate any benefit conferred on the recipient as referred to in subsection
(1), namely:–
(a) government provisions of equity capital shall not be considered to confer any benefit,
unless an investment can be regarded as inconsistent with the usual investment practice
including, for the provision of risk capital of private investors in the territory of an
exporting country;
(b) a loan by a government shall not be considered to confer any benefit, unless there is a
difference between the amount that a firm receiving the government loan pays on it and
the amount that the firm would pay for a comparable commercial loan which the firm
could actually obtain on the market, in which event the benefit shall be the difference
between these two amounts;
(c) a loan guarantee by a government shall not be considered to confer any benefit, unless
there is a difference between the amount that a firm receiving the guarantee pays on the
loan guaranteed by the government and the amount that the firm would pay for a
comparable commercial loan in the absence of the guarantee, in which case the benefit
shall be the difference between these two amounts, adjusted for any difference in fees;
and
(d) a provision of goods or services or purchase of goods by a government shall not be
considered to confer any benefit, unless the provision is made for less than adequate
remuneration or the purchase is made for more than adequate remuneration, and the
adequacy of remuneration shall be determined in relation to prevailing market conditions
for the product or service in question in the country of provision or purchase including
price, quality, availability, marketability, transportation and other conditions of purchase
or sale.
8. General provisions on calculation of countervailable subsidies.– (1) Subject to subsection
(2), the amount of countervailable subsidies shall be determined by the Commission in terms of
subsidization per unit of an investigated product exported to Pakistan and in establishing such amount
the following elements may be deducted from the total subsidy, namely:–
(a) any fee or other costs necessarily incurred in order to qualify for or, to obtain a subsidy;
and
(b) export taxes, duties or other charges levied on export of an investigated product to
Pakistan specifically intended to offset a subsidy.
(2) Where an interested party claims a deduction under subsection (1) such party shall prove to
the Commission that the claim is justified.
(3) Where a subsidy is not granted by reference to the quantities manufactured, produced,
exported or transported, the amount of countervailable subsidy shall be determined by allocating the
value of the total subsidy, as appropriate, over the level of production, sales or exports of the
products concerned during an investigation period for subsidization.
(4) Where a subsidy can be linked to acquisition or future acquisition of fixed assets, the amount
of countervailable subsidy shall be calculated by spreading the subsidy across a period which reflects
normal depreciation of such assets in the industry concerned, and the amount so calculated which is
attributable to an investigation period, including that which derives from fixed asset acquired before
such period, shall be allocated as provided for in subsection (2):
Provided that where assets are nondepreciating, a subsidy shall be valued as an interestfree
loan, and be treated in accordance with the provisions of subclause (b) of subsection (2) of section
7.
(5) Where a subsidy cannot be linked to acquisition of fixed assets, the amount of any benefit
received during an investigation period shall, in principle, be attributed to this period, and allocated as
provided for in subsection (2), unless special circumstances arise justifying attribution over a
different period.
PART V
DETERMINATION OF INJURY
9. Determination of injury.– (1) A determination of injury by the Commission shall be based on
positive evidence and shall involve an objective examination of –
(a) volume of any subsidised imports and their effect on prices in domestic market for like
products; and
(b) consequent impact of subsidised imports on domestic industry.
Explanation.– With regard to volume of any subsidised imports, consideration shall be given by
the Commission to whether there has been a significant increase in subsidised imports, either in
absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in Pakistan. With regard to effect of any
subsidised imports on prices, consideration shall be given by the Commission to whether there has
been significant price undercutting by the subsidised imports as compared with the price of a like
product of domestic industry, or whether the effect of such imports is otherwise to depress prices to a
significant degree or prevent price increases which would otherwise
have occurred, to a significant degree, provided that no one or more of these factors shall be deemed
to necessarily give decisive guidance.
(2) Where imports of a product from more than one country are simultaneously subject to an
investigation, the effects of such imports may be cumulatively assessed by the Commission only if it
determines that__
(a) the amount of countervailable subsidies established in relation to the imports from each
country is negligible as defined in subsection (3) of section 15 and that the volume of
imports from each country is not negligible; and
(b) a cumulative assessment of the effects of the imports is appropriate in the light of
conditions of competition between imported products and the conditions of competition
between the imported products and a like domestic product.
(3) An examination by the Commission of an impact of subsidised imports on a domestic industry
concerned may include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on
the state of the domestic industry including the fact that the domestic industry is still in the process of
recovering from the effects of past subsidisation or dumping, the magnitude of the amount of
countervailable subsidies, actual and potential decline in sales, profits, output, market share,
productivity, return on investments, utilisation of capacity, factors affecting domestic prices, actual
and potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability to raise
capital or investments and, in the case of agriculture, whether there has been an increased burden on
Government support programmes.
(4) The Commission shall satisfy itself that subsidised imports are, through the effects of
subsidies, as set forth in subsections (1) and (3), causing injury within the meaning of this Ordinance.
The consideration of a causal relationship between subsidised imports and injury to domestic industry
shall be based on an examination by the Commission of all relevant evidence before it.
(5) The Commission shall examine known factors other than subsidised imports which are injuring
domestic industry to ensure that injury caused by such other factors is not attributed to subsidised
imports. Such other factors may include factors such as the volume and prices of nonsubsidised
imports, contraction in demand or changes in patterns of consumption, restrictive trade practices of
and competition between a third country and domestic producers, developments in technology and
export performance and productivity of domestic industry.
(6) The effect of subsidised imports shall be assessed by the Commission in relation to the
production by domestic industry of a like product when available data permits separate identification
of that production on the basis of such criteria as the production process, producers’ sales and profits:
Provided that where such separate identification of that production is not possible, the effects of
subsidised imports shall be assessed by the Commission by examination of the production of the
narrowest group or range of products including a like product, for which the necessary information
can be provided.
(7) A determination of a threat of material injury by the Commission shall be based on facts and
not merely on allegation, conjecture or remote possibility and any change in circumstances which
would create a situation in which subsidy would cause injury must be foreseen and imminent.
(8) In making a determination regarding the existence of a threat of material injury, the
Commission shall take into consideration factors such as –
(a) the nature of subsidy or subsidies in question and any trade effects likely to arise
therefrom;
(b) any significant rate of increase of subsidised imports into a domestic market indicating the
likelihood of substantially increased imports;
(c) sufficient freely disposable capacity of an exporter or an imminent substantial increase in
such capacity indicating the likelihood of substantially increased subsidised exports into
Pakistan, account being taken of the availability of other export markets to absorb any
additional exports;
(d) whether imports are entering at prices that would, to a significant degree, depress prices or
prevent price increases which otherwise would have occurred and would probably
increase demand for further imports; and
(e) inventories of an investigated product.
Explanation.– None of the factors specified in subsection (8) by itself shall be deemed to
necessarily give decisive guidance but the totality of the factors considered by the Commission must
lead to the conclusion that further subsidised exports are imminent and that, unless protective action
is taken, material injury will occur.
10. Further circumstances in which injury may be found to exist.– (1) Where domestic
industry in relation to a product in question has been divided into two or more competitive markets
and the producers within each such market regarded as a separate industry in accordance with the
second proviso to clause (i) of section 2, injury may be found to exist even where a major portion of
the total domestic industry does not suffer injury provided that, there is a concentration of subsidised
imports into such a separated market, and provided further that the subsidised imports are causing
injury to the producers of all or almost all of the production within such market.
(2) Where injury is found to exist in the circumstances referred to in subsection (1), the
exporters or the government granting countervailable subsidies shall be given an opportunity to offer
an undertaking in accordance with section 14 in respect of the region concerned or to cease exporting
at subsidised prices to the region concerned prior to any countervailing measures being applied by the
Commission under this Ordinance.
(3) In the circumstances referred to in subsection (2), special account shall be taken by the
Commission of any interest of the region and if an adequate undertaking is not offered promptly or if
the situations set out in subsection (13) and (14) of section 14 apply, a
provisional or definitive countervailing duty may be imposed by the Commission in respect of
domestic industry as a whole.
(4) The provisions of subsection (6) of section 9 shall apply to this section.
PART VI
INVESTIGATION
11. Initiation of investigation.– (1) Save as provided for in subsection (11), the Commission
shall initiate an investigation to determine the existence, degree and effect of any alleged subsidy only
upon receipt of a written application by or on behalf of domestic industry.
(2) An application shall be submitted to the Commission with such fee as may be prescribed and
shall include sufficient evidence of the existence of countervailable subsidies including, if possible, of
their amount, and of injury within the meaning of this Ordinance and shall contain such information
as is reasonably available to an applicant on the following, namely:–
(a) identity of the applicant and a description of the volume and value of domestic production
of a like product by the applicant;
Provided that where an application is made on behalf of domestic industry, the application
shall identify the industry on behalf of which the application is made by a list of all known
domestic producers of the like product or, association of domestic producers of the like
product and, to the extent possible, a description of the volume and value of domestic
production of the like product accounted for by such producers;
(b) a complete description of an allegedly subsidised product including its current customs
tariff classification number as contained in the First Schedule to the Customs Act, 1969
(IV of 1969), the name of exporting country, identity of each known exporter or foreign
producer, and a list of known persons importing the product in question;
(c) evidence with regard to the existence, amount, nature and countervailability of subsidy
in question; and
(d) information on changes in volume of allegedly subsidised imports, the effect of those
imports on prices of a like product in domestic market and the consequent impact of the
imports on domestic industry as demonstrated by relevant factors and indices having a
bearing on the state of domestic industry, such as those listed in the explanation to subsection (1) of section 9, and in subsection (3) of section 9.
(3) The Commission shall, to the extent possible, examine the accuracy and adequacy of the
evidence provided in an application to determine whether it is compliant with the requirements of
subsection (2) and in order to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to justify initiation of an
investigation.
(4) An investigation may be initiated by the Commission in order to determine whether or not the
alleged subsidies are specific in accordance with the principles set out in section 5.
(5) An investigation may also be initiated by the Commission in respect of subsidies which are
noncountervailable in accordance with the provisions of section 6 in order to determine whether or
not the conditions set out therein have been met.
(6) If a subsidy is granted pursuant to a subsidy programme which has been notified in advance of
its implementation to the WTO Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures in accordance
with Article 8 of the Agreement on Subsidies and in respect of which the said Committee has failed to
determine that the relevant conditions laid down in Article 8 of the Agreement on Subsidies have not
been met, an investigation shall not be initiated by the Commission in respect of a subsidy granted
pursuant to such a programme, unless an infringement of Article 8 of the Agreement on Subsidies has
been ascertained by the competent WTO Dispute Settlement Body or through arbitration as provided
in Article 8(5) of the Agreement on Subsidies.
(7) An investigation may be initiated by the Commission in respect of measures of any type listed
in the Fourth Schedule, to the extent that they contain an element of subsidy as defined in section 4,
in order to determine whether the measures in question fully conform to the provisions of the Fourth
Schedule.
(8) An investigation shall not be initiated by the Commission pursuant to subsection (1) unless
the Commission is satisfied, on the basis of an examination as to the degree of support for, or
opposition to, an application expressed by domestic producers of a like product, that the application
has been made by or on behalf of domestic industry.
(9) An application shall be considered to have been made by or on behalf of domestic industry if
it is supported by those domestic producers whose collective output constitutes more than fifty
percent of the total production of a like product produced by that portion of domestic industry
expressing either support for or opposition to the application:
Provided that no investigation shall be initiated by the Commission when domestic producers
expressly supporting an application account for less than twentyfive percent of the total production
of a like product produced by domestic industry.
(10) The Commission shall, as soon as possible after receipt of a properly documented application
in accordance with the requirements of section 11, and in any event before initiation of an
investigation, give notice to an exporting country, which shall be invited for consultations with the
aim of clarifying the situation as to matters referred to in subsection (2) and arriving at a mutually
agreed solution.
(11) The Commission may, suo moto, initiate an investigation without having received a written
application by or on behalf of domestic industry if it has sufficient evidence of the existence of
countervailable subsidies and injury within the meaning of this Ordinance.
(12) The evidence both of subsidy and of injury shall be considered simultaneously by the
Commission in the decision on whether or not to initiate an investigation and an
application shall be rejected where there is insufficient evidence of either countervailable subsidies or
of injury to justify initiation of an investigation:
Provided that an investigation shall not be initiated against countries whose imports represent a
market share of below one per cent unless such countries collectively account for three per cent or
more of domestic consumption.
(13) An application may be withdrawn by an applicant prior to initiation of an investigation by
the Commission, in which case it shall, subject to the provisions of subsection (1) of section 15, be
deemed not to have been made:
Provided that upon withdrawal of an application any fee paid by an applicant pursuant to subsection (2) shall stand forfeited in favour of the Commission.
(14) Where, after consultation with an exporting country as provided for in subsection (10), the
Commission is satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to justify initiating an investigation, the
Commission shall give notice of such decision by means of a public notice of initiation of an
investigation, and the initiation of an investigation shall be effective on the date on which such notice
is published.
(15) Where the Commission does not consider it appropriate to initiate an investigation it shall
inform an applicant of its decision.
(16) The public notice of initiation of an investigation referred to in subsection (14) shall
announce initiation of an investigation, indicate the product and countries concerned, give a summary
of the information received, provide that all relevant information is to be communicated to the
Commission, state the periods within which any interested party may make itself known, present its
views in writing and submit information if such views and information are to be taken into account
during the investigation and shall also state the period within which interested parties may apply to be
heard by the Commission in accordance with subsection (4) of section 12.
(17) The Commission shall advise any exporters, importers and any association of importers or
exporters known to it to be concerned, as well as an exporting country and an applicant, of initiation
of an investigation and, subject to the requirements of section 29, provide the full text of an
application to the known exporters and to the authorities of an exporting country, and make it
available upon request to other interested parties involved:
Provided that, where the Commission determines that the number of exporters involved is
particularly high, the full text of a written complaint may instead be provided by the Commission only
to the authorities of an exporting country or to a relevant association.
(18) An investigation shall not hinder the procedures of customs clearance.
12. Principles governing investigation.– (1) Following initiation of an investigation, the
Commission shall commence an investigation and such investigation shall cover both subsidisation
and injury which, shall be investigated simultaneously.
(2) For the purpose of a representative finding, an investigation period shall be selected by the
Commission which, in the case of subsidisation shall, normally, cover an
investigation period provided for in section 7 and information relating to a period subsequent to the
investigation period shall not, normally, be taken into account by the Commission.
(3) Parties receiving questionnaires from the Commission used in a countervailing duty
investigation shall be given at least thirty days to reply and such time limit for exporters shall be
counted from the date of receipt of the questionnaire which, for this purpose shall be deemed to have
been received one week from the day on which it was sent to a respondent or transmitted to an
appropriate diplomatic representative of an exporting country:
Provided that where a party shows due cause for an extension to the satisfaction of the
Commission, an extension of not more than thirty days may be granted by the Commission at its
discretion.
(4) Any interested party which has made itself known in accordance with subsection (16) of
section 11 shall be heard by the Commission if it has, within the period prescribed in a public notice
of initiation of an investigation made a written request for hearing showing that it is an interested
party likely to be affected by the result of an investigation and that there are particular reasons why it
should be heard.
(5) Opportunities shall, on request, be provided for any importers, exporters and an applicant,
which have made themselves known in accordance with subsection (16) of section 11 and the
government of an exporting country to meet those parties having adverse interests, so that opposing
views may be presented and rebuttal arguments offered. Provision of such opportunities shall take
account of the need to preserve confidentiality and of convenience to the parties. There shall be no
obligation on any party to attend such meeting and failure to do so shall not be prejudicial to that
party’s case. Oral information provided under this subsection shall only be taken into account by the
Commission to the extent that the same is subsequently confirmed in writing and provided to the
Commission.
(6) Without prejudice to the provisions of section 42, an applicant, the government of an
exporting country, importers and exporters and their representative associations, which have made
themselves known in accordance with subsection (16) of section 11, may, upon written request,
inspect all information made available to the Commission by any party to an investigation, as distinct
from internal documents prepared by the Commission, which is relevant to presentation of their cases
and is not confidential within the meaning of section 29, and that it is used in an investigation. Such
parties may respond to such information and their comments shall be taken into consideration
wherever they are sufficiently substantiated in a response.
(7) Save as provided for in section 28, any information which is supplied by interested parties and
upon which findings are based shall, to the extent possible, be examined for accuracy by the
Commission.
(8) An investigation shall, whenever possible, be concluded within one year and in no event later
than eighteen months from its initiation, in accordance with the findings made pursuant to section 14
for undertakings or the findings made pursuant to section 16 for definitive action.
(9) Throughout an investigation, the Commission shall afford an exporting country a reasonable
opportunity to continue consultations with a view to clarifying the factual situation and arriving at a
mutually agreed solution:
Provided that the Commission may continue an investigation during such consultations.
(10) The Commission shall allow industrial users of an investigated product in Pakistan, and
representative consumer organisations in cases where the investigated product is commonly sold at
retail level in Pakistan to provide to the Commission, in writing, no later than two months after
initiation of an investigation, information concerning matters relevant to the investigation regarding
subsidisation dumping and injury.
PART VII
PROVISIONAL COUNTERVAILING MEASURES
13. Provisional countervailing duties.– (1) Provisional countervailing duty shall be imposed by
the Commission if –
(a) an investigation has been initiated by the Commission in accordance with section 11;
(b) a public notice of initiation of an investigation has been given and interested parties have
been given adequate opportunities to submit information and make comments in
accordance with subsection (16) of section 11; and
(c) a provisional affirmative determination has been made by the Commission that a subsidy
exists and that there is consequent injury to domestic industry.
(2) A provisional countervailing duty shall be imposed no earlier than sixty days from initiation of
an investigation but no later than nine months from initiation of the investigation and shall be in an
amount equal to the total amount of countervailable subsidies as provisionally established by the
Commission.
(3) A provisional countervailing duty shall be in the form of cash deposit equal to the amount of
the provisionally calculated amount of subsidisation:
Provided that the release of a product concerned for free circulation in Pakistan shall be subject
to provisions of such cash deposit.
(4) A provisional countervailing duty shall be imposed for a period not exceeding four months.
PART VIII
UNDERTAKINGS AND TERMINATION WITHOUT
MEASURES
14. Undertakings.– (1) An investigation may be terminated by the Commission without
imposition of provisional or definitive countervailing duties upon receipt of a satisfactory voluntary
undertaking under which –
(a) an exporting country agrees to eliminate or limit subsidy or take other measures
concerning its effects; or
(b) any exporter undertakes to revise its prices or to cease exports in question as long as such
exports benefit from countervailable subsidies, so that the Commission is satisfied that the
injurious effect of the subsidies is eliminated.
(2) Price increases under such undertakings shall not be higher than those which are necessary to
offset the amount of countervailable subsidies and shall be less than the amount of countervailable
subsidies if such increases would be adequate to remove injury to domestic industry.
(3) Undertakings may be suggested by the Commission but no country or exporter shall be
obliged to enter into such an undertaking and the fact that countries or exporters do not offer such
undertakings, or do not accept an invitation to do so, shall in no way prejudice the outcome of an
investigation by the Commission:
Provided that the Commission may in such circumstances determine that a threat of injury is
more likely to be realised if the subsidised imports continue.
(4) Undertakings shall not be sought or accepted by the Commission from countries or exporters
unless a provisional affirmative determination of subsidisation and injury caused by such subsidisation
has been made by the Commission.
(5) Save in exceptional circumstances, undertakings may not be offered later than the end of the
period during which representations may be made pursuant to subsection (7) of section 30.
(6) The decision to accept an undertaking shall rest with the Commission.
Explanation.– The Commission may not accept a price undertaking if it considers the acceptance
thereof to be impractical because the number of actual or potential exporters is too great or for
reasons of general policy or for any other reason.
(7) An exporting country or exporter concerned may be provided with the reasons for which it is
proposed to reject an offer of an undertaking and may be given an opportunity to make comments
thereon and the reasons for rejection shall be set out in a definitive decision by the Commission.
(8) Parties which offer an undertaking shall be required to provide a nonconfidential version of
such undertaking so that it may be made available to interested parties to an investigation.
(9) If an undertaking is accepted by the Commission, it shall nevertheless complete an
investigation if it receives a request from an exporting country or exporter in writing to continue such
investigation or where the Commission so decides on its own accord.
(10) In the event the Commission makes a negative determination of subsidisation and injury
pursuant to an investigation continued under subsection (9), an undertaking in question shall
automatically lapse except in cases where the Commission determines that such a determination is
due in large part to the existence of such undertaking in which case the Commission may require that
such undertaking be maintained for a reasonable period of time to be determined by the Commission.
(11) In the event the Commission makes an affirmative determination of subsidisation and injury
pursuant to an investigation continued pursuant to subsection (9), an undertaking in question shall
continue consistent with the provisions of this Ordinance.
(12) The Commission may require any country or exporter from whom an undertaking has been
accepted to provide, periodically, information relevant to the fulfilment of such undertaking and to
permit verification of such information.
(13) Failure to provide any information requested by the Commission pursuant to subsection (12)
shall be deemed to be a violation of an undertaking in question.
(14) Where undertakings are accepted from certain exporters during the course of an
investigation, they shall, for the purpose of sections 19, 20, 21 and 23 be deemed to take effect from
the date on which the investigation is concluded for an exporting country.
(15) If an undertaking is violated or deemed to be violated, the Commission may, subject to the
provisions of this Ordinance, take expeditious actions, which may include immediate application of
provisional measures using the best information available. In such cases, a definitive countervailing
duty may be levied in accordance with the provisions of this Ordinance on products entered for
domestic consumption not more than ninety days before the application of such provisional measures,
except that any such retroactive assessment shall not apply to imports entered before such violation
of the undertaking.
15. Termination of investigation without measures.– (1) Where an application is withdrawn, an
investigation shall be terminated by the Commission:
Provided that the Commission may, if it considers it fit to do so, continue an investigation
notwithstanding the withdrawal of an application in which event, the Commission may, subject to the
provisions of this Ordinance, impose such measures as are provided for in this Ordinance.
(2) Where, the Commission determines in accordance with the provisions of subsections (3), (4),
(5), (6) and (7), that the amount of countervailable subsidies is negligible or, where the volume of
subsidised imports, whether actual or potential, or injury is negligible then it shall immediately
terminate an investigation.
(3) The amount of countervailable subsidies shall be considered to be negligible if such amount is
less than one per cent ad valorem, except that –
(a) in the case of investigations concerning imports from developing countries the negligible
subsidy threshold shall be two per cent ad valorem; and
(b) for those developing countries which are referred to in the Fifth Schedule and other
developing countries which are members of the WTO and which have completely
eliminated export subsidies, the negligible subsidy threshold shall be three per cent ad
valorem.
(4) Where the application of subsection (3) depends on elimination of export subsidies, it shall
apply from the date on which elimination of export subsidies is notified to the WTO Committee on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures pursuant to the Agreement on Subsidies, and for so long as
export subsidies are not granted by a developing country concerned:
Provided that this provision shall expire on the first day of January, 2003:
Provided further that it is only an investigation that shall be terminated where the amount of
countervailable subsidies is below the relevant level for individual exporters who shall remain subject
to investigation by the Commission under this Ordinance and may be reinvestigated in any
subsequent review carried out for a country concerned pursuant to sections 19 and 20.
(5) Injury shall normally be regarded as negligible where the market share of any imports is less
than the amounts set out in the proviso to subsection (12) of section 11.
(6) In the case of an investigation concerning imports from developing countries, the volume of
subsidised imports shall be considered negligible if it represents less than four per cent of the total
imports of a like product in Pakistan, unless imports from developing countries whose individual
shares of total imports represent less than four per cent collectively account for more than nine per
cent of the total imports of a like product in Pakistan.
(7) In the case of an investigation concerning imports from countries other than developing
countries, the volume of subsidised imports shall be considered negligible if it represents less than
three per cent of the total imports of a like product in Pakistan, unless imports from such countries
under investigation which individually account for less than three per cent of the total imports of a
like product in Pakistan collectively account for more than seven per cent of imports of the like
product in Pakistan.
PART IX
DEFINITIVE COUNTERVAILING DUTIES
16. Imposition of definitive countervailing duties.– (1) Where the Commission has established
the existence of countervailable subsidies and injury caused thereby, a definitive countervailing duty
shall be imposed by the Commission, unless the subsidy in question is withdrawn or it has been
demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Commission that the subsidies no longer confer any benefit on
any exporters involved.
(2) A definitive countervailing duty shall be an amount equal to the amount of countervailable
subsidies from which any exporters have been found to benefit, as established by the Commission in
accordance with the provisions of this Ordinance.
(3) A definitive countervailing duty shall be imposed in an appropriate amount in each case, on a
nondiscriminatory basis, on imports of a product from all sources found to benefit from
countervailable subsidies and causing injury except as to imports from those sources from which
undertakings under section 14 have been accepted by the Commission.
(4) When the Commission has limited its examination in accordance with section 27, any
definitive countervailing duty applied to imports from exporters or producers which have made
themselves known in accordance with section 27 but were not included in an examination shall not
exceed the weighted average amount of countervailable subsidies established for parties in a sample.
(5) For the purposes of subsection (4), the Commission shall disregard any negligible amounts of
countervailable subsidies and amounts of countervailable subsidies established in the circumstances
referred to in section 28.
(6) Individual duties shall be applied to imports from any exporter or producer for which an
individual amount of subsidisation has been calculated as provided for in section 27.
PART X
RETROACTIVITY
17. Retroactivity.– (1) Save as otherwise provided in this section, provisional and definitive
countervailing duties shall only be applied to products which enter Pakistan for consumption after the
time when the requirements set out in subsection (1) of section 13 and subsection (1) of section 16,
as the case may be, have been fulfilled.
(2) Where the Commission makes a final determination of injury, but not of a threat thereof or of
material retardation of the establishment of an industry or, in the case of a final determination of a
threat of injury, where the Commission determines that the effect of subsidised imports would, in the
absence of provisional measures, have led to a determination of injury, definitive countervailing
duties shall be levied by the Commission retroactively for the period for which provisional duty, if
any, have been applied.
(3) If a definitive countervailing duty imposed by the Commission pursuant to subsection (2) is
higher than a provisional countervailing duty, the difference shal
The text continues in the official source.
