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ASIC RG 268
ASIC RG 268 — ASIC Regulatory Guide – RG 268 Licensing regime for financial benchmark administrators
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REGULATORY GUIDE 268
Licensing regime for financial
benchmark administrators
September 2026
About this guide
This guide is for financial benchmark administrator licensees. It explains how
we administer the financial benchmark licensing regime and how licensees
may comply with their obligations under the Corporations Act 2001, the ASIC
Financial Benchmark (Administration) Rules 2018 and the ASIC Financial
Benchmark (Compelled) Rules 2018. This guide also explains when we may
use some of our powers in relation to significant benchmarks.
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About ASIC regulatory documents
In administering legislation ASIC issues the following types of regulatory
documents.
Consultation papers: seek feedback from stakeholders on matters ASIC
is considering, such as proposed relief or proposed regulatory guidance.
Regulatory guides: give guidance to regulated entities by:
explaining when and how ASIC will exercise specific powers under
legislation (primarily the Corporations Act)
explaining how ASIC interprets the law
describing the principles underlying ASIC’s approach
giving practical guidance (e.g. describing the steps of a process such
as applying for a licence or giving practical examples of how
regulated entities may decide to meet their obligations).
Information sheets: provide concise guidance on a specific process or
compliance issue or an overview of detailed guidance.
Reports: describe ASIC compliance or relief activity or the results of a
research project.
Document history
This guide was issued in September 2026 and is based on
legislation and regulations as at the date of issue.
Previous versions:
Superseded Regulatory Guide 268, issued June 2018, reissued April
2022
Disclaimer
This guide does not constitute legal advice. We encourage you to seek your
own professional advice to find out how the Corporations Act and other
applicable laws apply to you, as it is your responsibility to determine your
obligations.
Examples in this guide are purely for illustration; they are not exhaustive and
are not intended to impose or imply particular rules or requirements.
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Contents
A Regulation of financial benchmarks .............................................. 4
Australian legislative framework ........................................................ 4
ASIC financial benchmark rules ........................................................ 5
About this guide ................................................................................. 5
B Applying for a licence or exemption .............................................. 6
Applying for a licence and conditions on a licence ............................ 6
Our approach to overseas licensees ................................................. 8
Exemptions ...................................................................................... 11
Licensee’s general obligations......................................................... 12
ASIC supervisory powers relating to financial benchmarks ............ 15
ASIC approval to have greater than 20% voting power .................. 16
C Governance, management and resources .................................. 18
Guiding obligations .......................................................................... 18
Governance, management and oversight ....................................... 18
Outsourcing...................................................................................... 20
Conflicts of interest .......................................................................... 21
Adequate resources ......................................................................... 22
D Licensed benchmark design, data and method ......................... 23
Benchmark design and method ....................................................... 23
Financial benchmark data................................................................ 24
Changes to the method ................................................................... 26
BBSW administrator must maintain final stage method .................. 26
Cessation of a licensed benchmark ................................................. 27
Guidelines or code of conduct on the responsibilities of
contributors ...................................................................................... 28
E Transparency, access and accountability .................................. 32
Disclosure about licensed benchmarks ........................................... 32
Reasonable and non-discriminatory access .................................... 33
Record-keeping ............................................................................... 34
Complaints ....................................................................................... 34
F Compulsion powers ...................................................................... 36
Overview .......................................................................................... 36
Requirement to continue administering a significant benchmark .... 36
Requirement to provide submissions to the administrator of the
BBSW .............................................................................................. 37
Key terms ............................................................................................... 39
Related information ............................................................................... 41
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A Regulation of financial benchmarks
Key points
Administrators of significant financial benchmarks (as declared by ASIC)
must hold a benchmark administrator licence or be exempt from holding a
licence. Administrators of other financial benchmarks may also apply for a
licence.
Licensed administrators must comply with obligations imposed by the
Corporations Act 2001 (Corporations Act), the ASIC Financial Benchmark
(Administration) Rules 2018 (administration rules) and any directions issued
by ASIC. Some of the administration rules also apply to contributors.
If we issue a notice under the ASIC Financial Benchmark (Compelled)
Rules 2018 (compelled rules), administrators and contributors named in the
notice must comply with the notice.
Australian legislative framework
RG 268.1 Financial benchmarks are indices or indicators used to:
(a) determine the interest payable, or other sums due, under loan
agreements or under other financial contracts or instruments;
(b) determine the price at which a financial instrument may be dealt, or the
value of a financial instrument; or
(c) measure the performance of a financial instrument.
Note: Section 908AB of the Corporations Act defines ‘financial benchmark’.
RG 268.2 Part 7.5B of the Corporations Act sets out the regulatory regime for financial
benchmarks. The regime also confers supervisory and rule-making powers
on ASIC.
Note: In this document, references to chapters (Chs), parts (Pts), divisions (Divs) or
sections (s) are to the Corporations Act, unless otherwise specified.
Significant financial benchmarks
RG 268.3 Under s908AC, we may declare, by legislative instrument, a financial
benchmark to be a significant benchmark. We may do so if we are satisfied
that:
(a) the benchmark is systemically important to the Australian financial
system; or
(b) there is a material risk of financial contagion, or systemic instability, in
Australia if the availability or integrity of the benchmark was disrupted;
or
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(c) there would be a material impact on retail or wholesale investors in
Australia if the availability or integrity of the benchmark was disrupted.
RG 268.4 We have declared a number of financial benchmarks to be significant
benchmarks under the ASIC Corporations (Significant Financial
Benchmarks) Instrument 2018/420.
Licensing
RG 268.5 An administrator of a significant financial benchmark must hold a financial
benchmark licence. Administrators of other financial benchmarks may also
apply for a licence.
Note: It is an offence for a person to administer (or hold out that they administer) a
significant benchmark without a licence: s908BA.
RG 268.6 ASIC must consider the factors set out in s908BO(2) when deciding whether
to:
(a) grant a licence application;
(b) impose, vary or revoke conditions on a licence;
(c) vary a licence; or
(d) suspend or cancel a licence.
Note: See s908BO(1).
ASIC financial benchmark rules
RG 268.7 We have made the following financial benchmark rules under the
Corporations Act:
(a) ASIC Financial Benchmark (Administration) Rules 2018
(administration rules) (s908CA); and
(b) ASIC Financial Benchmark (Compelled) Rules 2018 (compelled rules)
(s908CD).
About this guide
RG 268.8 Section B of this guide explains our approach to licence and exemption
applications and provides an overview of some of our powers in relation to
licensed administrators.
RG 268.9 Sections C–E of this guide explain how licensees may comply with
particular administration rules.
RG 268.10 Section F of this guide provides guidance about the compelled rules.
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B Applying for a licence or exemption
Key points
This section:
• explains our approach to assessing licence and exemption applications,
including from overseas benchmark administrators; and
• provides an overview of some of our powers in relation to licensed
administrators.
Applying for a licence and conditions on a licence
RG 268.11 Under s908BD, a body corporate may, by lodging an application with ASIC,
apply for a benchmark administrator licence authorising it to administer the
financial benchmark specified in the licence.
RG 268.12 Section 908BO lists matters ASIC must take into account when deciding
whether to grant a licence, impose a licence condition or make other licensing
decisions, including whether to grant exemptions. These matters are:
(a) how the financial benchmark is, or is to be, administered;
(b) the nature and purpose of the financial benchmark;
(c) the manner in which the financial benchmark is, or is to be, used;
(d) the persons who are, or may be, required to report data or other
information to the licensee for the purposes of generating or
administering the financial benchmark;
(e) for an entity that is authorised to administer the same or a similar
financial benchmark in the foreign country in which its principal place
of business is located:
(i) the criteria that the entity satisfied to obtain an authorisation to
administer that financial benchmark in that country;
(ii) the obligations the entity must continue to comply with to keep the
authorisation;
(iii) the level of supervision to which the administration of that
financial benchmark in that country is subject; and
(iv) whether adequate arrangements exist for cooperation between
ASIC and the authority that is responsible for that supervision; and
(f) whether it would be in the public interest to take the licensing or
regulatory action.
RG 268.13 We may also take into account any other matter that we consider relevant.
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RG 268.14 Section 908BC provides that ASIC may grant an applicant a benchmark
administrator licence if we are satisfied that:
(a) the application has been made in accordance with s908BD;
(b) the applicant will comply with its obligations if the licence is granted
(see RG 268.44); and
(c) no disqualified individual appears to be involved in the applicant (see
RG 268.47–RG 268.48).
RG 268.15 When deciding whether to grant a licence to an applicant, we will consider
whether the benchmark has some connection to Australia or whether there is
a potential benefit for the Australian financial system or Australian investors.
RG 268.16 ASIC must not grant an applicant a benchmark administrator licence unless:
(a) the applicant is registered under Div 2 of Pt 5B.2, where the applicant is
a foreign body corporate (s908BC(2)); and
(b) 42 days have passed since the application was made and we have not
given a notice under s853D(2) to the applicant within that time
(s908BC(3)).
Note: A notice under s853D(2) is a notice that we propose to make a declaration under
s853C that an individual who is involved in the licence applicant is disqualified for the
purposes of Div 2 of Pt 7.4.
RG 268.17 Under s908BG, we may impose conditions, or additional conditions, on a
benchmark administrator licence.
RG 268.18 We will make publicly available the list of licensees and their licence
conditions.
Disqualified individuals
RG 268.19 To enable us to assess the requirement in s908BC(1)(c) that no disqualified
individual appears to be involved in the applicant, or the applicant’s holding
company, an application should include the following:
(a) for each director, secretary and senior manager of the applicant:
(i) their full name, address and contact details; and
(ii) whether they are, or have been, disqualified; and
(b) for each individual who holds more than 20% voting power in the
applicant, or a holding company of the applicant:
(i) their full name, address and contact details; and
(ii) whether they are, or have been, disqualified.
Note: See s853A and 853B and RG 268.47.
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No unacceptable control situation is likely to result when a
licence is granted
RG 268.20 Where a domestically incorporated licence applicant has shareholders whose
voting power will exceed 20% when the licence is granted, we must
separately assess and approve each instance in which shareholder voting
power exceeds 20%. This assessment occurs at the same time as we consider
and decide the licence application. This process ensures that no unacceptable
control situation arises after the licence is granted: s852DA, 852DB and
852DD.
RG 268.21 Although we may consider a licence application and the voting power of
each of the applicant’s shareholders concurrently, we must issue a separate
written approval for each shareholder whose voting power will exceed 20%
at the same time we grant the licence.
RG 268.22 For further information, see ASIC approval to have greater than 20% voting
power in RG 268.59–RG 268.67.
Our approach to overseas licensees
RG 268.23 In some cases, an overseas administrator that is required to hold a
benchmark administrator licence may already be complying with the
requirements of a substantially equivalent overseas regulatory regime.
RG 268.24 In relation to these overseas administrators, we may consider:
(a) accepting reliance (in whole or in part) on compliance with overseas
regulation—for example, in lieu of direct compliance with specific
Australian obligations; and
(b) where appropriate, also exempting the benchmark administrator from
specified obligations under the Australian regime.
RG 268.25 We will adopt the approach that is most appropriate to the circumstances of
the particular case.
Reliance on regulation under an overseas regime
RG 268.26 Section 908AF provides that, if a licensed benchmark is wholly or partly
generated or administered in a foreign country, we may, to the extent we
consider appropriate, perform the function of supervising the licensed
benchmark by satisfying ourselves that:
(a) the regulatory regime that applies to the licensed benchmark in the
foreign country provides for adequate regulation of the licensed
benchmark; or
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(b) adequate cooperative arrangements are in place with an appropriate
authority of the foreign country to ensure that the licensed benchmark
will be adequately supervised by that authority.
Substantially equivalent regulatory regime
RG 268.27 To assess whether the regulatory regime that applies to the administration of
the licensed benchmark in the foreign country provides adequate regulation,
we will consider whether the overseas regulatory regime is sufficiently
equivalent to the Australian regulatory regime.
RG 268.28 We will apply the approach set out in Regulatory Guide 54 Principles for
cross-border financial regulation (RG 54), and consider the extent to which
the overseas regulatory regime, as it applies to the administration of the
licensed benchmark:
(a) is clear, transparent and certain;
(b) is adequately enforced;
(c) is consistent with relevant international principles (see RG 268.32); and
(d) achieves outcomes equivalent to the outcomes of the Australian
regulatory regime for financial benchmarks (see RG 268.33).
Note: See International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), Principles
for financial benchmarks (PDF 388 KB), final report, July 2013; and IOSCO, Principles
for oil price reporting agencies (PDF 423 KB), final report, October 2012.
RG 268.29 We may also consider whether the overseas regime provides for adequate
review and reporting on regulatory compliance, such as an annual external
audit of the licensee’s compliance with relevant international principles in a
way that meets the requirements of the overseas regime.
Consistent with international principles
RG 268.30 To determine whether there is sufficient regulatory equivalence between the
overseas regime and Australia’s regulatory regime, we will consider whether
an overseas regulatory regime is designed to achieve the policy outcomes of
relevant international principles.
RG 268.31 This may be demonstrated in a number of ways—for example:
(a) where the overseas regime applies the IOSCO benchmarks principles
(PDF 388 KB) in its regulations;
(b) where the overseas regime uses the IOSCO benchmarks principles as a
standard for assessing compliance with the overseas regime; or
(c) by reference to an assessment by IOSCO that the jurisdiction has fully
or broadly implemented the IOSCO benchmarks principles.
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RG 268.32 We will take into account any revised or newly established principles or
recommendations on financial benchmarks published by IOSCO, or other
relevant international standard-setting body or forum.
Equivalent outcomes to the Australian regulatory regime
RG 268.33 Consistent with the relevant international principles, we consider the
relevant outcomes are:
(a) robust governance and oversight arrangements;
(b) requirements to ensure the quality of the licensed benchmark, including
the design of the licensed benchmark and the use of data in determining
the licensed benchmark;
(c) requirements to ensure the quality of the licensed benchmark’s method;
and
(d) requirements to ensure a high level of accountability, including audit
and cooperation with regulatory authorities.
RG 268.34 To determine whether the overseas regulatory regime achieves the key
outcomes, we will focus on whether the outcomes are achieved from the
perspective of the stability of the Australian financial system, and the
protection and confidence of Australian investors.
RG 268.35 The regulatory mechanisms used in each country may differ. This means we
need to review and understand, in detail, the regulatory mechanisms used in
an overseas regime to achieve these regulatory outcomes, especially if they
are not the same as the Australian regulatory mechanisms.
Adequate cooperative arrangements
RG 268.36 We will normally expect that adequate cooperative arrangements with an
overseas regulator will provide for:
(a) prompt sharing of information by the home regulatory authority; and
(b) adequate exchanges of information to support our supervision,
investigation and enforcement functions.
RG 268.37 Adequate cooperative arrangements would usually involve direct and
continuing contact with the relevant officers of the overseas regulator.
RG 268.38 In some circumstances, we may not require a cooperative arrangement with
an overseas regulator if we have established information access
arrangements directly with the overseas licensee—for example, where the
licensee is complying with an overseas regime that has greater reliance on
regulatory mechanisms such as external audits undertaken by the licensee.
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RG 268.39 Where arrangements with the overseas licensee gives ASIC access to
information that is substantially similar to what we would have under a
regulatory cooperation arrangement with an overseas regulator, we may
decide that the licensee’s compliance with overseas regulatory obligations
could be considered to partially or wholly meet obligations under an
Australian licence. This does not affect the legal obligations of the licensee
under the Australian regime but does affect how we administer the regime.
Extent of reliance on overseas regime
RG 268.40 In these scenarios, we will work with the licensee to clarify:
(a) the extent to which we may rely on compliance with an overseas
regime’s requirements as meeting Australian requirements; and
(b) whether we will rely on regulatory cooperation arrangements with an
overseas regulator or require direct information access arrangements
with the licensee.
Exemptions
RG 268.41 We may exempt a person from the need to be licensed under Pt 7.5B or
from the specific obligations that will apply once a person is licensed.
An exemption may be subject to specified conditions.
RG 268.42 Generally, we will only exempt a person from the need to be licensed in rare
circumstances, including:
(a) where regulatory outcomes for financial benchmarks are not relevant to
the specific financial benchmark;
(b) where regulatory outcomes are achieved without regulation, for
example if an entity is subject to other forms of regulation that already
achieve all of the regulatory outcomes and benefits under Pt 7.5B;
(c) if the cost of regulation required to achieve the regulatory outcomes for
a financial benchmark significantly outweighs the benefits of those
outcomes; or
(d) if granting an exemption will harmonise with the intended scope of
relevant international principles.
RG 268.43 For overseas licensees, we may in some cases grant an exemption from
specified provisions of the Australian regime (with appropriate conditions)
where we are satisfied that the criteria outlined in s908AD have been met. In
other cases, we may determine that the licensee should remain subject to the
requirements of the Australian regime if that helps to maintain Australian
financial system stability or Australian investor confidence.
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Licensee’s general obligations
RG 268.44 Under s908BP, a benchmark administrator licensee must:
(a) comply with the conditions on its licence; and
(b) if the licensee is a foreign body corporate, be registered under Div 2 of
Pt 5B.2; and
(c) take all reasonable steps to ensure that each core officer of the licensee
is:
(i) a fit and proper person to perform their functions; and
(ii) capable, including being competent, to perform their functions;
(d) take all reasonable steps to ensure that no disqualified individual
becomes, or remains, involved in the administration of the financial
benchmark specified in the licence; and
(e) take all reasonable steps to ensure that no individual against whom a
financial market infrastructure (FMI) banning order is made becomes or
remains involved in the licensee or does any of the things prohibited
under the FMI banning order in relation to the licensee.
Core officers must be ‘fit and proper’ and ‘capable’
RG 268.45 A core officer of a benchmark administrator licensee includes:
(a) a director or secretary of the licensee; or
(b) a person:
(i) who makes, or participates in making, decisions that affect the
whole or a substantial part of the business of the licensee; or
(ii) who has the capacity to affect significantly the licensee’s financial
standing; or
(iii) in accordance with whose instructions or wishes the directors of
the corporation are accustomed to act (commonly known as a
shadow director).
Note: See s9 and s9AD1(a) and (b). Also see paragraph 3.110 of the Explanatory
Memorandum to the Treasury Laws Amendment (Financial Market Infrastructure and
Other Measures) Bill 2024.
RG 268.46 A benchmark administrator licensee should take all reasonable steps to
ensure that each core officer:
(a) is competent to undertake their role in relation to the administration of
the financial benchmark;
(b) has the attributes of good character, diligence, honesty, integrity and
judgement;
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(c) is not disqualified or subject to a banning order by law from performing
their role (s853A, 853F, 853H and 853K);
(d) has demonstrated the knowledge, skills and experience to perform their
role; and
(e) either has no conflict of interest in performing their role, or any conflict
that exists will not create a material risk that the person will fail to
properly perform their role.
Note: The criteria in RG 268.46 are consistent with the criteria for responsible persons
of authorised deposit-taking institutions in APRA’s Prudential Standard CPS 520 Fit
and proper, for Australian financial services licences in Regulatory Guide 1 Applying
for and varying an AFS licence (RG 1) and for Australian credit licences in Regulatory
Guide 204 Applying for and varying a credit licence (RG 204).
Individuals—disqualified or subject to a banning order––
not to become or remain involved in the administration of a
financial benchmark
RG 268.47 An individual is ‘involved’ in a benchmark administrator licensee if they are:
(a) a director, secretary or senior manager of the licensee, or in a holding
company of the licensee; or
(b) an individual who has more than 20% of the total voting power in the
licensee, or in a holding company of the licensee.
Note: See s853B.
Disqualified individuals
RG 268.48 Licensees must take all reasonable steps to ensure the following disqualified
individuals are not involved in the administration of the financial benchmark
specified in their licence:
(a) individuals declared by ASIC under s853C as being unfit to be involved
in the licensee, taking into account such matters as the individual’s
fame, character and integrity; or
(b) individuals who have been automatically disqualified from managing a
corporation due to certain circumstances including convictions,
bankruptcy and foreign court orders (s206B); or
(c) individuals who are on the register of disqualified company directors
and other officers that ASIC must keep under s1274AA.
Note: See s853A.
Individuals subject to FMI banning orders
RG 268.49 Licensees must take all reasonable steps to ensure that any individual who is
subject to an FMI banning order is not involved in the administration of the
financial benchmark specified in their licence.
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RG 268.50 We have the power to issue an FMI banning order to prevent an individual
who is insolvent, convicted of fraud, not fit and proper, not capable or
competent, or has not complied with (or is likely to contravene) a financial
services law from controlling or performing core functions at an FMI
licensee: s853H, 853L and 853M.
RG 268.51 Section 853K outlines the matters that we must consider when determining if
an individual is not ‘fit and proper’ for the purposes of FMI banning orders.
These matters include (but are not limited to) whether the individual has been:
(a) a core officer of an FMI licensee that had its licence suspended or
cancelled;
(b) subject to a banning order (including an FMI banning order);
(c) disqualified from managing corporations;
(d) banned from engaging in a credit activity (within the meaning of
the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 ) under a law of
a state or territory;
(e) an insolvent under administration;
(f) convicted of an offence in the last 10 years; or
(g) linked to a refusal or failure to give effect to a determination made by
the Australian Financial Complaints Authority.
Complying with ongoing obligations relating to core
officers’ ‘fitness and propriety’ and ‘capability’, and
‘disqualified’ or ‘banned’ individuals
RG 268.52 While there are no prescribed steps that a licensee must undertake to satisfy
the ongoing obligations in RG 268.44(c)–(e), a licensee may exercise its own
discretion in determining how it satisfies itself that these requirements have
been met. This may include making inquiries and assessments on a regular
basis (e.g. annually), such as undertaking a national criminal history check, a
bankruptcy check, and verifying that no disqualified individual, or individual
subject to an FMI banning order, is involved with or remains engaged by the
licensee.
RG 268.53 Licensees should retain supporting documentation evidencing these inquiries
and assessments, and should be able to provide such documentation to ASIC
on request.
Note: This approach is consistent with ASIC’s approach under the Australian Financial
Services Licence and Australian Credit Licence regimes, see RG 1 and Regulatory
Guide 206 Credit licensing: Competence and training (RG 206).
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ASIC supervisory powers relating to financial benchmarks
RG 268.54 ASIC may conduct an assessment of how well a licensee is complying with
any or all of its licence obligations. In doing the assessment, we may take into
account any information and reports that we consider appropriate: s908BW.
RG 268.55 If a licensed benchmark is wholly or partly generated or administered from a
foreign country, we may perform the function of supervising the licensed
benchmark by satisfying ourselves that:
(a) the regulatory regime in the foreign jurisdiction provides for adequate
supervision of the licensed benchmark; or
(b) there are adequate cooperation arrangements in place with the foreign
regulator to ensure that the licensed benchmark is adequately supervised.
Note: See s908AF(2).
Suspension and cancellation of a licence
RG 268.56 Under s908BI, we may, by written notice, suspend a licence for a specified
period, or cancel it, if:
(a) the licensee ceases to carry on the business of administering
the financial benchmark specified in the licence;
(b) it has been at least 12 months since ASIC granted the licence, and
during the last 12 months the licensee has not administered the financial
benchmark, or engaged in conduct or activity specified in the licence;
(c) the licensee is a Chapter 5 body corporate, or under a foreign law is in a
similar position to a Chapter 5 body corporate;
(d) the licensee asks ASIC to suspend or cancel its licence;
(e) the licensee is being deregistered as a company under s601AA or
601AB; or
(f) in the case of a licensee that is a leviable entity (within the meaning of
the ASIC Supervisory Cost Recovery Levy Act 2017), an amount of levy
payable by the licensee (including any payment or shortfall penalty
payable in relation to the levy) has not been paid in full at least
12 months after the payment due date.
ASIC’s power to require reports
RG 268.57 We may, by written direction, direct a benchmark administrator licensee to
give us a report dealing with specified matters. If we require, the report must
include an audit statement on the licensee’s report on those matters. In
addition, we may, by written notice:
(a) appoint an expert to provide us with a report on specified matters relating
to the benchmark administrator’s compliance with its obligations as a
benchmark administrator licensee; or
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(b) direct the licensee to appoint a specific person to provide us with an
expert report on specified matters relating to the licensee’s compliance
with its obligations as a benchmark administrator licensee.
RG 268.58 A licensee must give all information, explanation and assistance to the
expert, as the expert reasonably requests for the preparation and provision of
the expert report.
Note: See s908BV and 908BWA.
ASIC approval to have greater than 20% voting power
RG 268.59 ASIC approval is required before a person can hold more than 20% voting
power in a domestically incorporated financial benchmark licensee or its
holding company (a type of ‘controlled Australian financial body’): s852DG
and Div 1A of Pt 7.4. Guidance about voting power and related concepts is
set out in Regulatory Guide 5 Relevant interests and deemed economic
interests (RG 5).
RG 268.60 A person’s voting power in a licensee or its holding company is the total
number of votes attached to all the voting shares in the licensee or its
holding company: s610. Voting power can arise without a person directly
holding securities, for example through associates (see s12) or through
influence over another body. A single acquisition can trigger approval
requirements for multiple persons where each person’s voting power would
exceed 20%.
RG 268.61 To exceed the 20% voting power threshold, or to increase voting power that
is already over 20%, a person must apply to ASIC, specifying their current
and intended voting power, the period for which the approval is sought, and
the reasons for their application: s852DG. If any information in the
application changes or is incorrect after the application is made, the
applicant must, as soon as practicable, give ASIC the correct information in
writing: s852DQ.
RG 268.62 An unacceptable control situation exists in relation to a controlled Australian
financial body and a particular person if the person’s voting power exceeds
either 20% or an approved higher percentage: s852DB.
Note: If, on 17 September 2024, a person held more than 20% voting power in a
controlled Australian financial body, the person is taken to have been granted approval
by ASIC to hold that percentage of voting power indefinitely unless varied or revoked:
s1705L.
RG 268.63 We must provide written notice of our approval to the applicant if we are
satisfied that the specified percentage in the application is the highest
percentage of voting power, of that sought, for which the applicant passes
the ‘legitimate control test’, and we believe relevant information in the
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application, or later provided by the applicant, is correct. Otherwise, we must
refuse the application and notify the applicant in writing: s852DH. A person
passes the legitimate control test unless it is reasonable to expect that
holding the proposed voting power in the licensee or holding company
would adversely affect the licensee’s ability to meet one or more of its
obligations: s852DC. Our approval can be for a specified period—which
may be extended—or indefinitely, and can be subject to conditions.
RG 268.64 We have 90 days to decide on an application and may extend this by up to
30 days. If we do not decide within this period, approval is deemed to have
been granted. We may request further information and the decision period is
paused until information is provided or if an unacceptable control situation
exists: s852DR.
RG 268.65 We may impose, vary or revoke conditions after approval by written notice,
on our own initiative or by application from the person who holds the
s852DH(1) approval: s852DL.
RG 268.66 We may vary a person’s approval, such as changing the approved percentage
or duration, on application by the person holding the approval or on our own
initiative: s852DM.
RG 268.67 Under s852DN, we may revoke an approval if we are satisfied that:
(a) the person no longer passes the legitimate control test; or
(b) an unacceptable control situation exists in relation to the licensee and
the person; or
(c) there has been a contravention of an approval condition; or
(d) information provided by the applicant was incorrect at the time of our
decision.
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C Governance, management and resources
Key points
This section explains how we expect licensees to comply with rules for
governance, oversight and managing conflicts of interest, and how
licensees can meet the requirement to have adequate resources.
Guiding obligations
RG 268.68 Rule 2.1.1 of the administration rules requires a licensee to act efficiently,
honestly and fairly in generating and administering each benchmark
specified in its licence.
RG 268.69 A licensee’s arrangements for a licensed benchmark must be appropriate for
the nature, complexity and intended use of the licensed benchmark.
Consideration of what is appropriate for a particular licensed benchmark
should take into account the intended, expected or known use of the licensed
benchmark, and the nature of conflicts of interest arising in the generation
and administration of the licensed benchmark.
RG 268.70 Intended, expected or known use of the licensed benchmark could take into
account the types of users that have direct access to the licensed benchmark
(i.e. through a subscription service from the administrator), the types of
contracts or other functions that typically reference the licensed benchmark
and, where the information is readily available, the significance of the
licensed benchmark to the market.
RG 268.71 A licensee must also, to the extent that it is reasonably practicable to do so,
maintain the quality, integrity, availability, reliability and credibility of the
licensed benchmark, and generate and administer the licensed benchmark in
a way that does not adversely affect the integrity of any market connected
with the benchmark.
Governance, management and oversight
RG 268.72 Rule 2.1.2 of the administration rules requires a licensee to have adequate
arrangements for the governance and management of the licensee.
RG 268.73 The licensee must also have adequate arrangements for the oversight and
control of internal and external parties’ roles in the generation and
administration of a licensed benchmark. Oversight arrangements must ensure
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the licensee remains responsible for all of the functions involved in
generating or administering a licensed benchmark.
RG 268.74 Consistent with the IOSCO benchmarks principles (PDF 388 KB), the
concept of generation and administration of a financial benchmark should be
interpreted broadly to include:
(a) development—defining the financial benchmark and financial
benchmark method;
(b) determination and dissemination—accurate and timely determination
and distribution of the financial benchmark;
(c) disclosure—providing appropriate transparency of the financial
benchmark; and
(d) governance and oversight—establishing robust governance, oversight
and accountability arrangements to administer the financial benchmark,
including its development, determination and distribution.
Oversight arrangements
RG 268.75 Depending on the nature, complexity and intended use of a licensed
benchmark, an effective oversight arrangement might consist of an oversight
committee or another mechanism to review and challenge how all aspects of
the licensed benchmark are administered.
RG 268.76 The oversight function should involve reviewing and monitoring the
operational aspects of benchmark administration, including:
(a) benchmark design, including periodic reviews of benchmark design;
(b) changes to the benchmark’s method;
(c) risk monitoring, including risks to the integrity, reliability and
effectiveness of the licensed benchmark; and
(d) procedures for the cessation of the benchmark.
RG 268.77 The oversight function should apply to the governance of benchmark
administration, including:
(a) reviewing the guidelines, policies and conventions that support the
administration of the licensed benchmark;
(b) oversight of outsourcing to third parties;
(c) assessing the need for audits and external reviews and, where
applicable, implementing the outcomes of audits and reviews;
(d) monitoring any use of discretion by the licensee; and
(e) for submission-based benchmarks, ensuring more robust oversight of
monitoring of submissions and inputs.
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Audits and breaches
RG 268.78 Rule 2.1.2(3) of the administration rules requires a licensee’s governance
arrangements to be reviewed, audited and tested periodically. The frequency
of the audit, and whether it should be an internal or external audit, should be
determined taking into account the nature, complexity and intended use of
the licensed benchmark and how it is determined.
RG 268.79 Effective governance, management and oversight arrangements should
include a robust mechanism to identify conduct that may undermine the
integrity, reliability and effectiveness of the licensed benchmark. This should
include a whistleblower policy.
Outsourcing
RG 268.80 Rule 2.1.3 of the administration rules requires a licensee that outsources any
of the functions involved in generating or administering a licensed
benchmark to have documented arrangements with its service providers. A
licensee must have adequate arrangements to ensure it complies with its
obligations under Pt 7.5B in relation to the outsourced functions, and the
service provider is complying with its obligations under the outsourcing
arrangement.
RG 268.81 Consistent with the IOSCO benchmarks principles (PDF 388 KB), this rule
is particularly important for functions relating to the determination of the
licensed benchmark.
RG 268.82 A licensee may comply with Rule 2.1.3 of the administration rules by:
(a) ensuring that the service provider has the ability, capacity and any
authorisation required by law to perform the outsourced functions
reliably and professionally;
(b) appropriately supervising the service provider in carrying out the
outsourced functions;
(c) being able to terminate the outsourcing arrangements where necessary;
and
(d) requiring the service provider to disclose to the licensee any
development that may have a material impact on the service provider’s
ability to provide the outsourced functions.
RG 268.83 The licensee should also retain the necessary expertise to supervise the
outsourced functions effectively. This includes having people with sufficient
skills, knowledge and experience to assess whether the outsourced function
has been performed in line with the outsourcing arrangement.
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Conflicts of interest
RG 268.84 Rule 2.1.4 of the administration rules requires a licensee to have adequate
arrangements for handling conflicts of interest in relation to generating and
administering each of its licensed benchmarks.
RG 268.85 This rule is intended to ensure that actual or potential conflicts of interest do
not inappropriately influence benchmark determination, thereby ensuring
that the integrity, reliability and credibility of the licensed benchmark are
protected.
RG 268.86 In some cases it may be sufficient for a conflict of interest to be disclosed to
stakeholders, including users and contributors. In other cases, the rule may
require additional arrangements for managing or avoiding conflicts of
interest. For example:
(a) where a conflict is created by the licensee’s ownership structure or
controlling interests, it may be necessary to manage the conflicts by
having an independent oversight function. This function should be
comprised of a balanced representation of stakeholders, including users
and contributors;
(b) where the licensee, its affiliate or, in some cases, outsourced service
providers also provide non-benchmark administration services, this may
give rise to conflicts of interest. These must be subject to robust
oversight and should be disclosed to stakeholders, including
contributors and users;
(c) where discretion may be used in the benchmark determination process,
it must be free from the influence of conflicts of interest, be
independently and honestly exercised, and be subject to adequate
review and signoff before the determined benchmark is disseminated;
and
(d) conflicts of interest for the staff of the licensee should be specifically
considered and managed (e.g. ensuring their remuneration structure
does not create incentives based on the outcomes of benchmark
determination).
RG 268.87 Rule 2.1.4(3) of the administration rules requires a licensee’s arrangements
for handling conflicts of interest to be reviewed, audited and tested
periodically. The frequency of the audit, and whether it should be an internal
or external audit, should be determined taking into account the nature,
complexity and intended use of the licensed benchmark and how it is
determined.
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Adequate resources
RG 268.88 Rule 2.1.5 of the administration rules requires a licensee to have sufficient
human, technological and financial resources. In complying with this
requirement, a licensee should undertake:
(a) a qualitative assessment as to whether the resources are appropriate for
the tasks they are required to do; and
(b) a quantitative assessment as to whether enough of those resources are
applied to the task.
RG 268.89 Rule 2.1.6 of the administration rules requires a licensee to ensure that its
officers, managers, employees and representatives who are involved in the
generation or administration of the licensed benchmark are fit for office and
have the necessary experience, qualifications and skills to perform their
roles.
RG 268.90 In addition, licensees should maintain policies dealing with:
(a) staff training;
(b) periodic reviews for competence; and
(c) continuity and succession planning.
RG 268.91 Rule 2.1.7 of the administration rules requires a licensee to hold or have
legally certain access to financial resources to cover at least six months of
current operating expenses. For some licensees, it may be appropriate to
have a plan for raising additional equity, which should be approved by the
board.
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D Licensed benchmark design, data and method
Key points
This section explains how licensees may comply with administration rules
dealing with the design of a licensed benchmark, including:
• selecting and using financial benchmark data;
• the method for determining the licensed benchmark; and
• changes to the method.
It also explains how licensees are expected to comply with rules about:
• the cessation of the licensed benchmark; and
• maintaining written guidelines or a code of conduct for submitters.
Benchmark design and method
RG 268.92 Rule 2.2.1 of the administration rules requires a licensee to ensure a licensed
benchmark is designed, to the extent it is reasonably practicable, to be an
accurate and reliable representation of the interest it is intended to measure.
Rule 2.2.1 should be read in conjunction with Rule 2.2.3 about the method
for generating a licensed benchmark.
RG 268.93 Together, we consider these rules require the method to specify or refer to:
(a) definitions of key terms used in the method;
(b) the criteria and procedures used to develop the licensed benchmark,
including:
(i) how financial benchmark data is selected; and
(ii) the mix of financial benchmark data that may be used to determine
the licensed benchmark and the priority given to each type of
financial benchmark data;
(c) the minimum data needed to determine a licensed benchmark, and
whether and when a model or extrapolation may be used;
(d) if the generation of the licensed benchmark involves the exercise of
expert judgement or discretion by the administrator:
(i) the guidelines, rules and other controls that govern the exercise of
expert judgement; and
(ii) procedures and practices designed to promote consistency in how
expert judgement is exercised;
(e) the procedures for validating data. This means having procedures for
dealing with errors in financial benchmark data or in the benchmark
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determination, and when the licensed benchmark will be re-determined
because of errors that have been identified after the benchmark was first
determined;
(f) the procedures for reporting to ASIC suspicious activity in relation to
the financial benchmark data used to generate the financial benchmark;
(g) the frequency for internal reviews and approvals of the method. The
frequency and extent of the review should reflect the type and nature of
the benchmark, as well as any risks inherent in the design of the
method;
(h) when the licensee may consult on a proposed material change to the
licensed benchmark;
(i) how the licensed benchmark is determined when financial benchmark
data might be unreliable or absent—for example, in periods of market
stress or disruption; and
(j) the potential limitations of the benchmark, including when financial
benchmark data may be unreliable or absent.
RG 268.94 The design of a licensed benchmark also needs to be sufficiently flexible so
that it can be applied in a range of market conditions, but not so wide a range
that the licensed benchmark would not be representative of the interest it is
intended to measure.
RG 268.95 The licensee should also review and change the mix of financial benchmark
data as appropriate.
Financial benchmark data
RG 268.96 Rule 2.2.2(1) of the administration rules requires a licensee to take all
reasonable steps to ensure the financial benchmark data that is used to
generate a licensed benchmark is sufficient to accurately and reliably
represent the interest it is designed to measure.
RG 268.97 Financial benchmark data includes a wide range of data or information that
may be used to determine a financial benchmark. Licensees should have a
process for selecting the types of financial benchmark data to use and
determining who may contribute financial benchmark data.
RG 268.98 Rule 2.2.2(2) of the administration rules requires a licensee to have
appropriate internal controls over its data collection and transmission
processes. It also requires a licensee to have adequate arrangements to
control the acceptance, retention and use of financial benchmark data.
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RG 268.99 These arrangements must include arrangements reasonably designed to
ensure that the licensee accepts financial benchmark data only from
authorised persons (where applicable) and that the retention of financial
benchmark data maintains the security and integrity of that data.
RG 268.100 These arrangements must include monitoring and review processes that are
designed to ensure that the licensee uses accurate and complete financial
benchmark data. The monitoring and review arrangements should reflect the
nature of financial benchmark data used. For example:
(a) if a licensed benchmark uses submissions (particularly submissions that
involve use of expert judgement), it would be important to have
reasonably designed internal controls to identify non-compliance with
the submission guidelines and the applicable code of conduct;
(b) if a licensed benchmark uses market data, it may be appropriate to
review the completeness and accuracy of data when end-of-day market
information becomes available; and
(c) depending on the quality and integrity of the financial benchmark data,
it may be necessary to undertake statistical or other analysis of the
financial benchmark data against other relevant data or information
(such as data from the underlying market) to identify and follow up on
irregularities or potential errors, where reasonably practicable.
RG 268.101 Licensees should also have arrangements designed to enforce compliance
with the requirements for financial benchmark data as set out in the method
for calculating the licensed benchmark, guidelines or code of conduct. For
example, where financial benchmark data is obtained from commercial
vendors, there should be contractual provisions dealing with these matters
which provide sufficient commercial recourse if there is a breach of contract.
Hierarchy of financial benchmark data
RG 268.102 Rule 2.2.3(2)(c) of the administration rules requires the method to set out the
hierarchy for the order in which financial benchmark data will be used—
though transaction data should be used where it is available and sufficient.
This requirement will help the licensee and other stakeholders to assess
whether the method is reliable and generates an accurate representation of
the interest the licensed benchmark is intended to measure. Rule 2.2.2 of the
administration rules requires that, where data from an active market
involving arm’s length transactions is available and that data is sufficient to
accurately measure the interest, that data must be used.
RG 268.103 To meet these requirements, the licensee should ensure that the method:
(a) prioritises the use of transaction data. However, other data (such as
executable quotes or data sourced from commercial vendors) can be
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used if it provides a more accurate representation of the interest, market
or economic reality the licensed benchmark is intended to measure; and
(b) identifies the minimum quantity or quality required of each type of
financial benchmark data, and how the data will be used.
RG 268.104 Rule 2.2.3(3) of the administration rules requires a licensee to ensure the
method and its use of the method are reviewed and tested periodically, and
updated as appropriate. The frequency of the review and testing should be
determined taking into account the nature, complexity and intended use of
the licensed benchmark and how it is determined.
Changes to the method
RG 268.105 Rule 2.2.4 of the administration rules requires a licensee to take steps to
consult and notify users before making a proposed material change to the
method, including a final stage method (see RG 268.107–RG 268.108). The
requirement to consult and notify is a requirement to take such steps as are
reasonable to take in the circumstances. A licensee must also notify ASIC in
writing about the proposed change within a reasonable time before the
change is implemented.
RG 268.106 Where a licensee has procedures to consult on proposed changes to the
method, this can be done through advisory committees rather than public
consultation. We consider good practice consultation would involve:
(a) giving relevant stakeholders sufficient time to consider and provide
feedback; and
(b) providing information to stakeholders on consultation feedback where
practicable.
BBSW administrator must maintain final stage method
RG 268.107 Rule 2.2.5 of the administration rules requires that a licensee whose licence
specifies the BBSW must maintain a method (a final stage method) for
generating and administering the BBSW that will allow the BBSW to be
generated when normal methods have failed or are likely to fail.
Note: BBSW means the bank bill swap rate, a short-term money market benchmark
interest rate, as specified in a benchmark administrator licence under s908BC(1).
RG 268.108 A final stage method must require contributors to provide financial
benchmark data based on the exercise of expert judgement by the
contributors.
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Cessation of a licensed benchmark
RG 268.109 Rule 2.4.1 of the administration rules provides that, where a licensee intends
to cease administering or generating a licensed benchmark, the licensee must
give ASIC reasonable notice and have arrangements for ensuring the orderly
transition of the licensed benchmark to another administrator or the orderly
cessation of the generation and administration of the licensed benchmark.
RG 268.110 This rule is intended to give ASIC reasonable time to consider the likely
impact of the transfer or cessation of a licensed benchmark, and to consult
with other regulators, such as the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA), where
appropriate. As such, we expect the licensee to informally discuss any
consideration of cessation with ASIC as early in the process as possible. We
also expect licensees to provide formal notice as soon as practicable after
forming the intention or making the decision to cease or transfer
administration and generation of the licensed benchmark.
RG 268.111 Orderly transition or cessation of the generation or administration of a
licensed benchmark requires a licensee to consider the impact on financial
contracts or products that reference the licensed benchmark, at least where
these contracts or products are within the scope of the intended use of the
licensed benchmark. The transition arrangements plan should address:
(a) whether the contracts or products can be amended to refer to another
financial benchmark and whether the other financial benchmark is a
viable alternative; and
(b) whether there is enough time for the contracts or products to be
amended before the proposed cessation date.
Market announcements
RG 268.112 The licensee should have clear written policies and procedures to address the
possible cessation of a licensed benchmark. Arrangements should consider
the types of communication the licensee needs to provide in the event of
cessation. Appropriate communication should provide transparency and
clarity for all market participants. This is particularly important because the
communication and announcements made by the licensee may trigger
clauses in certain contracts to replace the ceasing benchmark with an
alternative reference rate.
RG 268.113 We consider that market announ
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